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Goldstein: Civil Rights

CIVIL RIGHTS

HAMMER V. GROSS: POUNDING
OUT A NEW STANDARD IN
EXCESSIVE FORCE ACTIONS
1.

INTRODUCTION

In Hammer v. GrossI, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the proper question for the jury in an action arising under
42 U.S.C. Section 19832 alleging excessive force by a police officer, is whether the level of force employed was objectively reasonable in light ofthe facts and circumstances at the time of the
incident. 3 In reaching its decision, the court applied the analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v.
Connor.' The en bane panel also clarified prior decisions regarding FRCP 516, reaffirming that there is no "plain error" exception in civil cases in the Ninth Circuit. 6 The Court also held that
under the circumstances, the arresting officer and police chief
were entitled to qualified immunity from the Section 1983
claim, but that the City of Newport Beach was not. 7
II.

FACTS

On June 23, 1985, plaintiff Timothy Hammer was arrested by Newport Beach police officer Armando Zatarain, upon
probable cause,s for driving under the influence of alcoho1. 9
1. 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc, per Canby, J., Farris, J., and Schroeder,
J.; Kozinski, J., and Nelson, J., concurring in part, except to section III of the court's
opinion; Reinhardt, J., specially concurring except to section IV of the court's opinion;
Beezer, J., Browning, J., Fernandez, J., Goodman, J., Thompson, J., dissenting.).
2. See infra note 27 and accompanying text for discussion of Section 1983.
3. Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d at 846.
4. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). See infra note 37 and accompanying text for full discussion of the Graham decision.
5. See note 51 and accompanying text for discussion of Rule 51.
6. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 848.·
7. [d. at 850-51. See infra section IV, subsection A(4) for a discussion of qualified immunity for Office Zatarain and Chief of Police Gross.
8. Id. at 844. (Hammer failed a series of field sobriety tests administered by
Zatarain.).
9. [d.
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Zatarain told Hammer that he would be required to take a blood,
urine or breath test to determine his blood alcohol content as mandated by California Vehicle Code Section 23157. 10 Hammer refused. 11
Zatarain drove Hammer to a Newport Beach Hospital. 12 There,
Zatarain handcuffed Hammer by his right wrist to a hard plastic
chair and asked Hammer whether he would submit to a blood
test. 13 When Hammer verbally refused, Zatarain told a laboratory
technician to withdraw a blood sample despite Hammer's
objections. l ' Hammer claimed that Zatarain grabbed his shoulders
from behind and pinned him to the chair while the technologist
swabbed his forearm with iodine. 16 Hammer jumped when the
technologist attempted to insert the needle. 16 As Hammer tried to
wrestle away from the needle, Zatarain attempted to immobilize
him and the two tumbled sideways to the floor, with Hammer
twisting his back as he hit the ground. 17 Zatarain lifted Hammer
off the floor and told him that the blood would be extracted "the
10. 1d. See Cal. Veh. Code Section 23157 (Deering, 1987) which provides in pertinent part:
Any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have
given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her
blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content of his or her blood ....
11. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844. Hammer later testified that he did so because he
felt there was a good possibility that the tests would indicate intoxication. [d. See Cal.
Veh. Code § 13353 (Deering, 1987) which provides in pertinent part:
[i]f any person refuses an officer's request to submit to, or
fails to complete a chemical test or tests pursuant to §
23157, upon receipt of the officer's sworn statement that
the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person
had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of § 23152
or 23153 and that the person had refused to submit to, or
did not complete, the test or tests after being requested
by the officer, the department shall (1) suspend the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 6 months, (2)
revoke the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for
2 years if the person has been convicted of a separate violation of § 23103 as specified in §§ 23103.5, 23152 or
23153 within 5 years of the date of refusal, or (3) revoke
the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 3
years if the person has been convicted of2 or more separate violations of § 23103 as specified in §§ 23103.5,
23152 or 23153, or any combination thereof, within 5
years of the date of refusal.
12. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844.
13. [d.
14. 1d. Hammer later testified that he refused the blood test because he does not

like needles. 1d.
15. 1d. Zatarain denied having touched Hammer from the time Hammer was first
seated in the emergency room until the technologist completed the blood extraction. [d.
16. [d.
17. [d.
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easy way or the hard way. "18 Hammer then agreed to take a
breathalyzer test, but Zatarain insisted on the blood test and held
Hammer in the chair as the blood was withdrawn. 19
On September 23, 1985, Hammer filed a Section 1983 action20
claiming violation of his constitutional rights. 21 Following a
three-day trial,22 a jury awarded Hammer compensatory and
punitive damages against Zatarain and Newport Beach Chief
of Police Charles Gross, as well as compensatory damages
against the City of Newport Beach.23 On appeal, a three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial judge
had erred in denying defendants' motions for directed verdict
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 24 Upon Hammer's
petition, the Ninth Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc. 26
III.
A.

BACKGROUND
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A SECTION

1983 ACTION ARISING

FROM A CLAIM OF EXCESSIVE FORCE

Section 1983 26 came into existence as Section 1 of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871. 27 It was enacted to provide a
18. [d. Zatarain called two other officers into the room, threatening to throw
Hammer to the floor and pin him down in order to obtain the blood sample. [d.
19. [d.

20. See infra note 27 and accompanying text for discussion of Section 1983.
21. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 843-44.
22. Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200 at 1202 (9th Cir. 1989). The defendants had
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the individual defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity and that because Officer Zatarain was no closer than five feet
from Hammer during the blood withdrawal, there was no genuine issue of material
fact. The District Court denied the motion. At the close of the trial, the defendants
moved for a directed verdict, which was also denied. [d.
23. [d. The court denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. [d.
24. [d. at 1200-08. The court based its reversal on its finding that the amount of
force applied by Zatarain was minimal and did not exceed the amount necessary to effect
the lawful seizure of blood alcohol evidence. The court found that Zatarain's conduct was
not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. [d. at 1208.
25. Hammer v. Gross, 902 F.2d at 774.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
27. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,171 (1961). The Monroe opinion discusses R.S.
§ 1979. The statutory language in R.S. 1979 is identical to the language used in 42
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remedy for a citizen whose constitutional rights had been violated by abuses of official power. 28 The provision was enacted
with "three main aims. "29 The first of these was to override state
legislation which was adverse to the rights or privileges of citizens of the United States. SO The second purpose was to provide
a remedy where state law was inadequate. 31 The legislation was
also intended "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. "32 This final purpose was largely a reaction to the activities
of the Ku Klux Klan and the lawless conditions existing in the
South in 1871. 33 Congressional debate over Section 1 of the Ku
Klux Klan Act makes clear that one reason for the provision
was to create a right enforceable in federal courts. This was necessary because, by reason of "prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges and
immunities guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment might
be denied by the state agencies. "34 The intent of Section 1983
was not solely to provide compensation to victims of abuses of
official power, but also to serve as a deterrent against such
future constitutional infringements. 36
U.S.C. § 1983. Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction of Civil Rights Act of 1871
(42 USCS § 1983) Providing Private Rights ofAction For Violation of Federal Rights,
43 L.Ed. 2d 833, 839.
28. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
29. [d. at 173.
30. [d. (Citing Congo Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 268).
31. [d. In 1871, when the Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted, many state laws were
prejudicial toward blacks. For example, several states would not allow a black man
to testify in any case against a white man. [d. at 174.
32. [d. at 174. The Court stated that it was the "failure of certain States to enforce
the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful momentum" behind the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act. [d. at 174-75.
33. [d. at 176. Senator Osborn of Florida stated to Congress:
That the State courts in the several States have been
unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective
States or to suppress the disorders existing, and in fact that
the preservation oflife and property in many sections of the
country is beyond the power of the State government, is a
sufficient reason why Congress should ... enact the laws
necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States.
(Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653.)
34. [d. at 180.
35. Owen V. City ofIndependence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). Plaintiff brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his rights to procedural and substantive
due process after having been discharged from his position as Chief of Police of
defendant City. [d. at 626. The City gave no reason for the dismissal, plaintiff having
received only a written notice that the dismissal was made pursuant to a provision of
the city charter. [d. The Eighth Circuit court held that a municipality has no
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In Hammer, the Ninth Circuit panel applied the analysis
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v.
Connor 36 for determining whether force utilized by a state
agent is excessive. The Graham Court rejected the fourteenth
amendment substantive due process approach established in
Rochin v. California 37 and rejected prior appellate court rulings
which interpreted Rochin as requiring a substantive analysis
of a law enforcement officer's motives in determining whether
excessive force was utilized. 3S The Court set forth a new standard of review for excessive force claims against law enforcement
officers under Section 1983. 39 In Graham, the Court stated that
immunity from § 1983 and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to
such liabilities. [d. at 651.
36. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Plaintiff Graham, wrongly suspected of wrongdoing in
a convenience store, was apprehended by defendant Connor, who ignored his claims
of being diabetic. [d. at 389. Graham momentarily lost consciousness, was shoved by
several officers face first into the hood of the patrol car and thrown head first into the
car by four officers. [d. The Court held that claims of excessive force by a government
official should be analyzed under the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard.
[d. at 395.
37. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion.) (Overruled by
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S 386). The Rochin Court considered whether the forceful
extraction of the contents of a suspect's stomach by order of police officers, in order
to obtain evidence against the suspect, violated the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. Rochin at 168-74. The Court observed that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees respect for those personal
immunities which are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental." [d at 169, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934). The Court set forth the test that conduct which "shocks the conscience" violates the due process guidelines set forth in the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 172-74.
The Graham Court rejected the Rochin analysis in favor of analysis under the fourth
amendment and its reasonableness standard. Graham, 490 U.S. 386 at 393-95.
38. In Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973), the Second Circuit interpreted the Rochin test to mean that the court must
consider "the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted and whether force
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." [d. at 1033 (emphasis added). Two
years after the decision, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Johnson substantive due
process test in Meredith v. State of Arizona 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975). In Meredith,
the court held that an unprovoked assault and battery by a guard upon a state
prisoner was a violation of that prisoner's right to due process. [d. at 484. The court
stated that in light of Johnson, conduct under color of state law that can be fairly
characterized as "intentional, unjustified, brutal and offensive to human dignity"
violates the victim's right to substantive due process. [d. The Johnson test found more
recent Ninth Circuit affirmation in Rutherford v. City of Berkeley 780 F.2d 1444 (9th
Cir.1986).
39. Graham, 490 U.S. 386, 393-99. The Graham court recognized that the lower
federal courts had applied the Johnson substantive due process test indiscriminately to all Section 1983 excessive force claims against law enforcement officers, without
considering whether the use of force might fall under a more specific constitutional
right. [d. at 393. The court rejected the view that Section 1983 excessive force claims
should be governed by the substantive due process standard. [d. at 393-94.
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analysis of such a claim should commence by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly violated by the use of force. 40
The Court rejected the validity of the Rochin analysis,41 and held
that all claims alleging the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers during arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure42
should be analyzed under the fourth amendment 4S and its reasonableness standard, as opposed to the fourteenth amendment substantive due process approach.44
The Graham Court also considered the level of force which
would be considered unreasonable under the fourth amendment
standard.46 This analysis must allow for the fact that law
enforcement officers are often forced, in tense and rapidly
evolving situations, to make split-second determinations of the
amount of force required under the circumstances. 46 The question to be addressed is whether the actions of the officer are
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances,
without consideration of the officer's intent or motivation. 47 The
Court concluded that the four-part test of Johnson v. Glick,46
which considers whether the officer acted "in good faith" or
40. Id. at 394.
41. Id. at 395. See supra note 37 for discussion of the Rochin analysis. The
Graham court stated that it was making explicit what was implicit in the analysis set
forth in Tennessee v. Garner. 471 U.S. 1 (1985». In Garner, a case involving the use
of excessive force by the police, the Court held that in order to determine whether a
seizure is reasonable, and thus constitutional, the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the individual's fourth amendment rights must be balanced against the governmental interests supporting the intrusion. Id. at 8.
42. A ·seizure," triggering the protection of the Fourth Amendment, occurs
when a government official, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains
the liberty of a citizen. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n. 16 (1968).
43. U.S. Con st. amend. IV states:
The rights of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
44. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The Court bases this stance on the fact that the
fourth amendment is an explicit constitutional protection from physically intrusive
government conduct, as opposed to the more general notion of substantive due process.
Id.
45. Id. at 396.
46. Id. at 396-97, see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. (Holding that the facts of a
particular case must be judged against the objective standard of whether the
information available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate.)
47. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
48. See supra, note 38, for discussion of the Johnson test.
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"maliciously and sadistically," has no place in a proper fourth
amendment analysis.,g Such sUbjective motivations have no
bearing on whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under
the fourth amendment. 6o
The analysis developed in Graham considers only whether
the level of force applied by the officer was objectively reasonable in light of circumstances existing at the time of the incident. The analysis is to be applied by the jury, free from all
subjective considerations.
B.

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

51 IN

Rule 5pl of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
designed to bring possible errors to the attention of the court
while there is still time to correct them without the cost, delay
and expenditure of judicial resources necessitated by retrials. 62
Circuits other than the Ninth have adopted a "plain error"
exception to FRCP Rule 51, similar to the "plain error" exception found in Rule 52(b)63 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 64 Although Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure shares a common purpose with Rule 51 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no statutory "plain error" rule
is found with regard to civillitigation. 66 In Bertrand v. Southern
49. Id.
50.Id.
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 provides in pertinent part:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless that party objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of objection.
52. See Bertrand v. Southern Pacific Co., 282 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 816 (1961).
53. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) provides:
Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention
of the court.
Rule 52(b) is applicable in conjunction with and as an exception to Fed. R. Crim. P.
30, which provides in pertinent part:
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or
omission [in an instruction to the jury] unless that party
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects
and the grounds of the objection.
54. See e.g., Nimrod v. Sylvester, 369 F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1966); Ramsey v.
Travelers, 317 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1963).
55. See Hargrave v. Wellman, 276 F.2d 948, 950 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1960).
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Pacific,56 the court stated that regardless of other circuits'
rules, in the Ninth Circuit the plain error rule may not be
applied in civil appeals in order to review jury instructions
where the ground asserted was not raised at tria1. 57
Most circuits, excluding the Ninth Circuit, have stated in
dicta that an appellate court may reverse for plain error in an
instruction to which no objection was made. 56 These statements, however, recognize that such power is to be exercised
only where necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice. 69
The Ninth Circuit stated one possible exception to its strict
enforcement of Rule 51 in Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Systems,f,o There, the court stated that ifit is aware
of a party's concerns with an instruction and further objection
would serve no purpose, the party will not be required to take part
in the "pointless formality" of lodging a formal objection. 61

IV.
A.

COURT'S ANALYSIS
MAJORITY OPINION

1. Standard for Analysis of a Section 1983 Claim Arising
From Excessive Use of Force

In determining that the proper question for the jury in an
excessive force claim is whether an arresting officer's use of
force was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances
existing at the time of the incident,62 the Hammer court commenced its analysis by considering whether the facts of the case
were sufficient to sustain the jury verdict for Hammer.63 The
56. 282 F.2d 569, 572.
57. [d.
58. C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2558, at 672
(1971). See e.g. Nimrod v. Sylvester, 369 F.2d 870, 873 (1st Cir. 1966).
59. [d.
60. 732 F.2d 1403, 1410 (9th Cir. 1984).
61. [d. In Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth
Circuit was presented with an appeal of a Section 1983 case arising out of the use of
excessive force. At trial, the district court had instructed the jury that in determining whether excessive force was used, it should consider if the force was applied in good
faith or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. [d. at 820. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the Johnson v. Glick instruction was plain
error, but observed that the force utilized in the case was not excessive, thus avoiding the need to permit a "plain error" exception. [d.
62. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846.
63. [d. at 846-47.
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court observed that under Schmerber v. California,64 it is not
a violation of the fourth amendment for police, with probable
cause but without a warrant, to extract a blood sample from an
individual suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol,
who had been arrested and hospitalized, and who had refused
to take a breathalyzer test." The Ninth Circuit observed that
the Schmerber court emphasized the routine nature of the
test and the fact that it was performed by a physician in a hospital. 66 Additionally, the Schmerber Court took pains to limit
its holding to the facts of the case. 67 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defense's argument that the Schmerber decision necessarily legitimized the use of force to overcome resistance to a
procedure which the police are entitled to use." The Court
observed that the crucial question was whether a rational
jury could conclude that the force used on Hammer was excessive under the circumstances. 69
64. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The plaintiff had been arrested upon probable cause for
driving under the influence of alcohol. [d. at 758. At a hospital, a physician, on direction of the arresting police officer, withdrew a blood sample from the plaintiff, despite
his verbal refusal to such.ld. at 759. There is no suggestion in Schmerber of any physical resistance by the suspect or use of force by the police. Hammer 932 F.2d at 844.
65. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844-845, citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72.
66. Id. at 845. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1956), the court permitted
the withdrawal of blood from a hospitalized, unconscious subject. The court stated that
"there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done
... under the protective eye of a physician." Id. at 435.
67. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772). The Hammer
court observed that the plaintiff did not seek an alternative blood alcohol content test
on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruples. See Schmerber 384 U.S.
at 771.
68. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845. While no force was utilized in Schmerber, the defendants in Hammer argued that the decision legitimized the use of force to overcome resistance to a procedure which the defendants were entitled to employ.ld. They asserted
that the Schmerber court could not have intended a rule which would give no weight
to a suspect's verbal objection, but would give effect to an objection accompanied by
physical resistance. Id. In support of this argument, the defendants cited a footnote
in Schmerber:
We "cannot see that it should make any difference whether
one states unequivocally that he objects or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such condition that he is
unable to protest." (Citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
at 441 (Warren, C.J. dissenting». It would be a different case
if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or
responded to resistance with inappropriate force. Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 760 n. 4.
69. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845. The Court assumed for the purpose of its decision
that Schmerber does not preclude the use of force to extract a blood sample from a
resistant suspect in some situations. Id. The defendants contended that the force to
which Hammer was subjected was not excessive because, as Hammer admitted, it did
not rise to a level that "shocks the conscience," Id., the measure of what constitutes

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 10

102

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:93

The test for determining whether the force employed was
excessive was stated in Graham v. Connor. 70 The Graham
Court held that claims of excessive force by a government
official should be analyzed under the fourth amendment and
its reasonableness standard, as opposed to a fourteenth amendment substantive due process approach.71 Under this test, the
trier of fact must ask whether the "officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation."72 The test balances "'the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. "73
The reasonableness of the use of force is "judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight. "74

2.

Application of Graham Analysis

Although Graham had not been decided at the time of
Hammer's 1985 arrest, the Ninth Circuit observed that under
the test applied in Reed v. Hoy,76 the Graham analysis is to be
applied retroactively.76 Ordinarily, the Ninth Circuit will
retroactively apply a decision reformulating federal civil
law. 77 However, in certain cases, retroactive application of
new case law may produce an inequitable result. 76 In Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson 79 , the Supreme Court set forth an analysis for
determining whether new case law should be applied
retroactively.so Under this analysis, the Graham standard
excessive force formulated in Rochin. The measure of excessive force set forth in Rochin
was overruled by the Supreme Court in Graham, 490 U.S. 386.
70. 490 U.S. 386. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for discussion of
Graham.
71. [d. at 395. This standard applies whether the officer is making an arrest,
investigatory stop or other seizure of a free citizen. [d.
72. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).
73. [d. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
74. Hammer, 932 F.2d 846 (citing Graham 490 U.S. at 396).
75. 909 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991). The court
held that in determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively, a court
must consider the three factors set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106107 (1971) (See note 80 infra, for discussion of the Chevron analysis.)
76. [d. at 327-328.
77. Austin v. City of Bisbee, 855 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1988), (citing Mineo
v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 779 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1986».
78. Reed, 909 F.2d at 327.
79. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
80. [d. Under the Chevron analysis, new case law should be applied only
prospectively if it (1) establishes a new principal of law, by overruling clear past
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was properly applied retroactive to the time of Hammer's
arrest. 81
In light of the Graham decision, the question facing the
Ninth Circuit became whether a rational jury could find that
the defendants' use of force to overcome Hammer's resistance
and extract a blood sample was not "objectively reasonable in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. "82
While Hammer did forcibly resist the blood test, which he
had no right to do, his offense was only a misdemeanor.83 The
plurality stressed that Hammer posed no threat to the officer
or to others at the hospitaV14 Perhaps most important, however,
is the fact that Hammer, prior to the extraction of blood,
agreed to submit to a breathalyzer test. 86 If an alternative
test is available and requested by the suspect, a police officer
may not arbitrarily refuse to administer such simply because
the suspect did not make the decision more promptly or had a
change of mind. 88 The defendants argued that Hammer's
precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impres.
sion whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) states a rule whose retrospective operation will retard rather than further its operation, considering the
rule's prior history and its purpose and effect; (3) is a decision whose retroactive application could produce substantial inequitable results, and for which a holding of nonretroactivity would avoid injustice or hardship. Id. at 106-07.
81. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846. While Graham does overrule past Ninth Circuit
precedent, the United States Supreme Court states in that decision that it was "making explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis .... " (Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
Therefore, the Court did not view its decision in Graham as establishing a new principle of law. Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 328 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, Graham may be
applied retroactively under the first element of the three-part Chevron test. Because
Graham furthers the essential purpose of the fourth amendment - guaranteeing that
citizens are "secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures of the person" (U.S. Const. amend IV) - retroactive application of the decision will further rather
than retard the policies announced therein. Id. Thus, retroactive application is
acceptable under the second of the Chevron tests. Additionally, retroactive application of Graham will not result in any substantially inequitable results. Id. The primary factor to be considered with regard to whether substantial inequities will
result, is whether a party has reasonably relied on a law which was later invalidated. Id. The Graham decision surmounts the effect of the third factor in the Chevron
test.
82. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).
83. Id. at 846.
84. Id. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating that the proper application of the
test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment requires consideration of whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and others).
85. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845. In his concurring opinion, Judge Kozinski stated
that a decision for Hammer should turn solely on this fact. Id. at 851.
86. 1d. at 852. Judge Kozinski points out that the defense offered no evidence that
Hammer's consent came too late 4ue to the ineffectiveness or unavailability of an alternative test. Id.
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consent to the breathalyzer test was not given in good faith and
was an attempt to create further delay.87 While recognizing that
this was possible, the Ninth Circuit held that the jury could
have concluded that Hammer's consent was sincere, rendering
any further use of force unreasonable. 88 Upon considering
these factors, and the fact that "the integrity of an individual's
person is a cherished value of our society, "89 the Ninth Circuit
panel held that the question of reasonableness of force by the
defendants, under the circumstances of the case, was a proper question for the jury.90

3.

FRCP Rule 51 in the Ninth Circuit

Despite the Hammer court's holding that the issue of reasonableness of force was a proper question for the jury, the
defendants argued that the jury verdict should not stand
because the jury was led to believe that force could never be
properly utilized to extract a blood sample. 91 The jury was
instructed to apply the due process test of unreasonable force
which was set out in Johnson v. Glick 92 and subsequently
rejected by Graham. 93 The "malicious and sadistic" element of
the Johnson analysis puts in question the subjective motives
of an officer which, according to Graham, does not bear upon
whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 94 The Ninth Circuit panel agreed that this factor
could have led the Hammer jury to find that force had been
applied with an improper intent, rendering the use of force
impermissible. 96
The court maintained, however, that despite the improper
jury instruction, the defendants failed to object to the
87. [d. at 846. The Schmerber Court noted that the percentage of alcohol in the
blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body eliminates it from
the system. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
88. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846.
89. [d., (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.)
90. [d. At trial, the Judge denied defendants' motions for a directed verdict
and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Hammer, 884 F.2d 1200 at 1202. On
first appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that because Hammer failed to establish that he
had been deprived of any fourth amendment right, the trial judge had erred in denying the defendants' motions. [d. at 1202-1208.
91. [d. at 846-47.
92. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). See supra note 38 for discussion of the Johnson
test.
93. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397.
94. [d.

95. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 847.
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instruction and did not make known any concern with the
lower court's due process excessive force instruction. 96 Thus,
they were in no position to complain about it.97 The Ninth
Circuit, as the strictest enforcer of Rule 51,98 has declared
that there is no plain error exception for civil cases in the circuit." In Hammer, the court again maintained its standing as
a firm enforcer of Rule 51, stating that its position has spared
it the "burden of having to review afterthought claims of errors
in the instructions" which counsel sought to pursue under the
auspices of plain error. 100 In his concurring opinion, Judge
Reinhardt urged the court to relax its approach to the enforcement of Rule 51, and "join other circuits in adopting a more flexible and reasonable approach."lol
4.

Qualified Immunity for Zatarain and Gross

With regard to Hammer's claims against Chief of Police
Gross and the City of Newport Beach, the defendants contended that even if officer Zatarain were found to have used
excessive force, there was no evidence that Gross or the City
sanctioned such as a policy.l02 Chief Gross testified that during
his tenure, he was responsible for establishing the policies of
the Newport Beach Police Department. los When a suspect
refused all three blood alcohol content tests, the City's policy
was that blood could be forcibly extracted, so long as the force
did not "shock the conscience."l04 The decision of whether to utilize force in order to obtain a blood sample was left to the
officers' discretion. l06 From Gross' testimony and the corroborating testimony of a witness l06 who had previously been
96. [d.
97. [d.

98. See C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2558, at 674
(1971):
The Ninth Circuit stands alone in reading Civil Rule 51
literally and denying that there is any power to reverse
for plain error in an unobjected-to instruction in a civil
case.
99. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 847.
100. [d. at 848 (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
Section 2558 at 674-75).
101. [d. at 851 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
102. [d. at 849.
103. [d.
104. [d., see also Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
105. Hamme,., 932 F.2d at 850.
106. Witness Bohunis testified that several months prior to the Hammer arrest,
he had been apprehended by Officer Zatarain and, after being unable to complete a
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apprehended by Officer Zatarain, the court concluded that
the jury could have reasonably found that Chief Gross had
established a policy which permitted the use of force over and
above a level reasonable under the circumstances. l07
Defendants Zatarain and Gross argued that they were
entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability as a
matter of law. 108 The defendants would be immune from liability
if reasonable officers in their position, in light of clearly established law, could have reasonably believed that their actions
were lawful. l09 The panel in Hammer conceded that the standard of review under Graham, as applied to this case, can
result in a jury finding that force is excessive, although it did
not rise to a level that shocks the conscience. l1o However, at the
time of Hammer's arrest, Graham had not yet been decided.
The Ninth Circuit ruled in Hammer that because a reasonable
officer would not have anticipated the Graham ruling, officers
Zatarain and Gross were immune from personal liability for
their actions. 111 Despite the fact that the force which Zatarain
applied and Gross authorized was unreasonable, it was
well below the level that shocks the conscience. 112 Citing
Owen v. City of Independence, 113 in which the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a municipality may not assert the
good faith of its officers as a defense to Section 1983 liabilIty, the Hammer court refused to extend the granting of
immunity to the City of Newport BeachY4
In light of the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Hammer, and the
fact that the City of Newport Beach was not entitled to
breathalyzer test, was subjected to a blood extraction over his resistance by the substantial forcible efforts of seven officers. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. At the time of Hammer's arrest both Breithaupt, 352 U.S. 432, and
Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, had been decided. Breithaupt permitted the withdrawal of
blood when the hospitalized subject was unconscious. Breithaupt at 436-39. That decision adopted the rule of Rochin; force that "shocks the conscience" violates substantive due process. Id. (Hammer concedes that the Rochin standard was not violated by
Zatarain and Gross. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 850). See note 64 and accompanying text
for discussion of Schmerber.
110. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 850.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). The Court observed that the knowledge that a municipality will be held liable for all of its injurious conduct should create an incentive for
officials who have doubts regarding the lawfulness of their actions to minimize the likelihood of infringements on the constitutional rights of citizens. Id. at 651-52.
114. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 850.
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immunity, the court vacated the decision of the three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit, and reinstated the jury verdict
against the City of Newport Beach for compensatory damages
of $2,500. 116
B.

DISSENT

In his dissent, Judge Fernandez, joined by Judges
Browning, Goodwin, Bezer and Thompson, noted that under the
authority of Schmerber, the extraction of blood can be carried out without a warrant in order to preserve transient evidence. 116 Fernandez emphasized that under Graham, police
are permitted to use some physical force in order to extract a
blood sample. 117 The dissent contended that in light of that element of Graham, the fourth amendment did not prohibit
Officer Zatarain from exerting force in order to obtain the
blood sample. 118 Pointing to the fact that Officer Zatarain did
not initiate the physical contact and used no more physical force
than minimally necessary to obtain the blood sample, the dissenting Judges concluded that there was no evidence from
which a jury could reasonably conclude that Officer Zatarain
employed excessive force in gaining the sample. 119
V.

CRITIQUE

A.

JURY APPLICATION OF THE GRAHAM ANALYSIS

The test adopted by the Hammer court to determine
whether force used in a seizure is reasonable under the fourth
amendment is one of objective reasonableness under the circumstances. 120 However, given the nature of the analysis set out
in Graham 121 and applied by the Ninth Circuit in Hammer, the
fourth amendment analysis in excessive force cases is subject
to improper application resulting from jury subjectivity.122 A
115. [d. The case was remanded to the three-judge panel for consideration of the
issue of attorney's fees, raised by Hammer.
116. [d. at 854 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770).
117. [d.
118. [d.
119. [d.
120. [d. at 845-46 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 399).
121. See supra, notes 36-44 and accompanying text for full discussion of the
Graham analysis.
122. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Court recognized
that a jury's consideration of whether a defendant's conduct was outrageous had an
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possible consequence is that in the hands of a jury, the analysis applied in Hammer may not differ greatly in result from the
fourteenth amendment analysis rejected by Graham.
Because the "objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances" analysis cannot be applied mechanically,l23 it is entirely foreseeable that a jury may hold that behavior is
unreasonable if, in viewing the circumstances facing an officer
at the time of the incident in question, the behavior shocks the
consciences of individual jurors. 124 The problem is one of objectivity: if an individual juror is shocked by the nature of the
intrusion, that juror may be guided by that shock rather than
the objectivity required by Graham. As the Hammer court
points out, to apply the "shocks the conscience" standard is to
employ a shorthand version of a due process test which is no
longer applicable in analyzing the propriety of force utilized in
effecting a search. 126
In order to allow a jury to apply the Graham test as intended by the Court, jurors should be informed of the Rochin test
and that it has been overruled by the United States Supreme
Court. The jurors should be admonished to look beyond the fact
that certain behavior may be shocking to their individual consciences - a task, in and of itself difficult for jurors to perform
- and proceed with the fourth amendment analysis as set
forth in Graham. By giving detailed instructions and educating
the jury about the overruled Rochin analysis, the court will not
only guide the jury to the appropriate test to apply, but will also
explicitly warn the jurors to avoid the pitfall of unknowingly
applying Rochin's overruled due process test.
A question which remains regarding a jury's possible misapplication of the Graham analysis is whether such will necessarily result in unjust verdicts. While a jury may apply
Graham's objective analysis incorrectly, being influenced by
subjective factors, the result will not necessarily be unjust. It
is probable that a decision based upon jurors having
inherent subjectiveness about it. Id. at 55. Ajury might impose liability on the basis
of the jurors' tastes or views. Id. A similar concern may arise in the consideration of
an excessive force case where jurors may be unable apply a test in an objective manner due to their individual sympathies and emotions.
123. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
124. See supra note 37 for a discussion of the -shocks the conscience" test as set
forth in Rochin, 342 U.S. 165.
125. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845.
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unwittingly applied a "shocks the conscience" test will be equitable. However, because the Ninth Circuit has adopted the
Graham analysis, the courts must give a jury detailed instructions in order to insure that the test is properly applied.
The Graham analysis requires a balancing of the nature and
quality of the intrusion of the individual's fourth amendment
interests against the governmental interests at stake. 126
Because the reasonableness aspect of the fourth amendment
is not capable of mechanical application,127 the test of reasonableness requires prudent attention to the circumstances of a
particular case. 128 This includes the severity of the crime,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the officer
or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or
evading arrest. 129
The factors which a jury must consider in order to reach a
decision under the Hammer analysis give rise to the issue of
how a jury oflay people can judge what amount of force is reasonable for an officer under particular circumstances. A suspect element of the analysis is whether the jury is in a position
to doubt what the officer believed was reasonable under the circumstances at the time of the search or seizure. The jury is to
judge this from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. 130 The
question which arises from this aspect ofthe analysis is whether
it is possible for lay people to put themselves in the shoes of a
reasonable officer who has undergone extensive police training
and lives with the prospect of violent encounters on a daily basis.

B.

CONSIDERATION OF POLICE REPORTS

Another factor to be considered in light of the Hammer
decision is whether the standard of "objective reasonableness
in light of the circumstances" will affect how an officer writes
his report of an incident, which may be introduced as evidence. 131 Police reports may be demonstrably reliable evidence
126. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396); see also Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536·37 (1967); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
703 (1983).
127. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559).
128. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
129. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
130. 1d. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
131. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly exclude police reports from
the public records exception of the hearsay rule, (Fed. R. Evid. 803 (8)(B», where the

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 10

110

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:93

that an arrest was made, but they are significantly less reliable
evidence of whether the allegations they contain of criminal
conduct are true. 132 An officer who is aware of the Hammer standard may employ language in his report, such as "under the circumstances at the time, I believed that the force used was
reasonable." Alternatively, an officer may attempt to sanitize
or lie in his report. Ajury, having no first-hand knowledge of
the circumstances, should be warned against placing blind
faith in an officer's report in determining whether that officer's
use of force was unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
Without such an admonition, consideration of the defendant
officer's report in an excessive force trial poses a potential
hinderance to an equitable result. If such reports are admitted,
the jury should be instructed as to the potential problems
such documents may hazard.
C.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE SEVERITY OF THE CRIME
AT ISSUE

In its analysis, the Hammer court adopted an element of the
Graham test which requires the jury to consider the severity
of the crime at issue. 133 The court stressed that Hammer's
offense was only a misdemeanor. 134 This raises the question of
whether the court is suggesting that an individual suspected
of a felony is entitled to less protection by the fourth amendment than an individual suspected of a misdemeanor. The
fourth amendment makes no such distinction and in no way
indicates that its rule should be applied differently according
to varying degrees of the offense in question. 136 Although it initially appears that a jury instructed in this element of the
Hammer analysis may be led to apply the fourth amendment
in a manner never clearly indicated by the Framers, case law
indicates otherwise. 13s Court application of the fourth
officer is unavailable to testify, the report should be admitted as the best available evidence. (Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 93-1277.)
132. United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986). "[C]ongress exhibited similar doubts about the reliability of[police] reports when it specifically excluded them from the public records exception to the hearsay rule in criminal cases." [d.
133. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846.
134. [d.
135. See supra note 43 for the text of U.S. Const. amend. IV.
136. See e.g., Hood v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1991) (Stating that
holding a suspected felon pending fingerprint clearance is justifiable because the risk
of flight or danger to the public is greater with a person charged with a felony that one
charged with a misdemeanor.)
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amendment indicates that the severity of the crime at issue
should be considered by jurors as an element of a reasonableness analysis under the fourth amendment.

D.

REASONABLENESS IN CONSIDERATION OF TRANSIENT EVIDENCE

The Hammer analysis leaves it in the hands of the jury to
determine what level of force, applied in order to obtain a
blood sample from an individual suspected of driving under the
influence of alcohol, is reasonable in light of the transient
nature of the evidence. 1S? The dissent points out that police are
entitled to apply some physical force in order to extract a
blood sample from such a suspect.1SS However, Hammer did consent to a breathalyzer test after refusing the extraction of a
blood sample. 139 The question arises whether, due to the transient nature of the evidence required to determine blood alcohol content, there should be a point at which an individual
suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol should no
longer be permitted to change his mind with regard to which
test he will take. The majority held that Hammer's consent to
take a breathalyzer test could be found by the jury to have been
given in good faith. l40 Such a determination by the jury may
tend to be based more on speculation than any knowledge of
what the suspect had in mind at the time. However, a good faith
determination, considering the totality of the circumstances at
the time, is the best approach to this problem. An individual
arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence must submit to an extremely intrusive blood alcohol content test, or face
an automatic suspension of his driver's license.l4l Considering
the intrusive nature of these procedures, it is not at all unlikely that a suspect will have some difficulty choosing a test
and experience a change of mind with regard to that decision.
A solution to the problems that such indecision creates is for
the courts to adopt a presumption of good faith in situations
where suspects display such indecisiveness. The burden of
137. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846.
138. [d. at 854 (citing Graham at 396-97). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740 (1984), observing that a warrantless home arrest made in order to gain evidence
of the plaintifrs blood alcohol content was violative of the fourth amendment despite
the exigent circumstance of the transient nature of the evidence. [d. at 754.
139. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844.
140. [d. at 846.
141. See supra, notes 10 and 11 for the pertinent California Vehicle Code provisions.
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overcoming that presumption would be on the arresting officers, who would have to demonstrate bad faith by a preponderance of evidence.

E.

RULE

51

IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Ninth Circuit stands alone in reading Fed. R. Civ. P. 51
literally and allowing no plain error exception to the rule. 1• 2 In
his concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt states that he would
be inclined to take a more flexible approach to its enforcement of Rule 51. 143 In Nimrod v. Sylvester,I •• the First Circuit
stated its practice of holding the option to notice plain error of
its own volition. 1• 6 The Nimrod court observed that the plain
error rule should be "applied sparingly and only in exceptional cases or under peculiar circumstances to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice. "1.6
Uniform application should exist for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 147 But the Ninth Circuit has remained the
lone opponent among the district courts to a plain error exception to Rule 51. 146 Where gross inequities would otherwise
result, the Ninth. Circuit should take advantage of future
opportunities to create uniform application of the plain error
exception. It should abandon its reputation as the strictest
enforcer of Rule 51 and take the more moderate approach
hinted at in Reed and Eberle .1.9 While in doing so the court will
142. See supra, notes 98·100 and accompanying text for discussion of the Ninth
Circuit's position on a plain error exception in civil actions.
143. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 851. Judge Reinhardt points to the Ninth Circuit decisions in Reed, 909 F.2d 324, and Eberle, 901 F.2d 814. In Reed, the court found upon
review that the trial court had committed a plain error in its jury instructions. Reed
at 330. Counsel, however, had objected to the instruction, and the court avoided
making a plain error exception. Id. at n. 4. See supra n. 61 and accompanying text for
discussion of Eberle.
144. 369 F.2d 870.
145. 1d. at 873.
146. 1d.
147. "One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true
of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings.· Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963).
148. See supra, note 98.
149. See also, Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), in which dissenting Judge Brennan states that the absence of a plain error "provision in the Civil
Rules suggests that review of unchallenged jury instructions is intended to be more
restrictive that under the Criminal Rules," 1d. at 276·77 n. 7. suggesting that perhaps
a restrictive plain error exception should apply in civil cases.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/10

20

Goldstein: Civil Rights

CIVIL RIGHTS

1992]

113

take on the burden of reviewing afterthought claims of error, 160
it need not lose its strict reputation with regard to Rule 51. The
Ninth Circuit should join the other circuits in conservatively
granting plain error exceptions. If there is to be a uniform plain
error exception to Rule 51, it should be "confined to the exceptional case where the error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."151
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Hammer v. Gross,t52 the Ninth Circuit held that Section
1983 claims of excessive force by a police officer are to be analyzed
under the fourth amendment and its reasonableness standard.
Under this standard, set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Graham v. Connor,l53 the jurors must determine whether
the application offorce was objectively reasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances facing the officer at the time. l54
In order to insure that the jury applies the Hammer standard
effectively, the judge presiding over an excessive force case
should carefully instruct the jurors, not only to be certain that
they fully understand the analysis, but also to guide them away
from inadvertently applying the test of Rochin v. California 155
which Graham rejected. The jury should also be admonished that
police reports which are admitted as evidence are not a source
of indisputable fact. In addition, the Ninth Circuit should take
a more lenient approach to its denial of a plain error exception
to Rule 51, allowing exceptions in instances in which to do
otherwise would result in gross miscarriages of justice.
While the Hammer standard is the best path to equitable
outcomes in Section 1983 claims of excessive force, it is by no
means an unwavering route to just results. The analysis is such
that proper application will follow only from courts' painstaking attention to clear and informative jury instructions.

Daniel J. Goldstein*
150. C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Section 2558, at
674-75.
151. [d. at 675. See also Nimrod, 369 F.2d at 873, stating that "Only the most palpable of errors will be noticed on appeal when no objection was made in the district
court."
152. 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1991).
153. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
154. [d. at 486.
155. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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